Ethnopolitical Conflicts in Eastern Europe and the OSCE - An Interim Appraisal by Troebst, Stefan
Ethnopolitical Conflicts in Eastern Europe
and the OSCE
An Interim Appraisal
Stefan Troebst
ECMI Brief # 1
August 1998
2The European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) is a non-partisan institution
founded in 1996 by the Governments of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and the German State of Schleswig-Holstein. ECMI was
established in Flensburg, at the heart of the Danish-German border region, in
order to draw from the encouraging example of the peaceful coexistence
between minorities and majorities achieved here. ECMI’s aim is to promote
interdisciplinary research on issues related to national minorities and majorities
in a European perspective and to contribute to the improvement of inter-ethnic
relations in those parts of Western and Eastern Europe where ethnopolitical
tension and conflict prevail.
ECMI Brief is written either by the staff of ECMI or by outside authors
commissioned by the Centre. As ECMI does not propagate opinions of its own,
the views expressed in any of its publications are the sole responsibility of the
author concerned.
ECMI Brief # 1
European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI)
Director: Stefan Troebst
© ECMI 1998
EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR MINORITY ISSUES (ECMI)
Schiffbruecke 12 (Kompagnietor Building) D-24939 Flensburg
Phone +49-(0)461-14 14 9-0            Fax +49-(0)461-14 14 1-19
info@ecmi.de                                                http://www.ecmi.de
3Ethnopolitical Conflicts in Eastern Europe and the OSCE
An Interim Appraisal
by  Stefan Troebstby Stefan Troebst”
SUMMARY
Three levels or institutions have emerged as crucial within the OSCE
framework for handling ethnopolitical conflicts in Eastern Europe—the
Permanent Council made up of the OSCE Permanent Representatives of
the currently 55 participating States, the OSCE High Commissioner on
National Minorities and the long-term missions which the OSCE maintains
in over a dozen trouble spots. The OSCE shows considerable success in
dealing with ethnopolitical conflicts where away from its rivalry with the
United Nations, NATO or the European Union it can set its sights
somewhat lower — Chechnya, Crimea, the Baltic states, South Ossetia,
Transdniestria, Macedonia and Eastern Slavonia. Here OSCE has
succeeded in transforming conflicts that have broken out and in
contributing to the prevention of future conflicts. However, major conflicts
such as Bosnia-Hercegovina or Nagorny-Karabakh appear to be too
unmanageable for OSCE’s still embryonic structures with its insufficient
military know-how and low acceptance among major partners.
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By Stefan Troebst
For the „old“ CSCE1, the period between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the start
of the Serbian wars for the Yugoslav succession as well as the implosion of the
Soviet Union was too short to respond effectively. Not until the summer of 1992
when the Helsinki II document was signed with its decisions on strengthening
CSCE institutions and structures, on establishing the office of High
Commissioner on National Minorities and on early warning systems, conflict
prevention, crisis management, and the peaceful settlement of disputes were the
foundations laid for a “new“ and more responsive CSCE (called the OSCE since
1 January 1995).2 From then on instruments emerged with which some of the
negative effects of the interlinked processes of state collapse and nation-building
in Eastern Europe could be stemmed.3 The CSCE tried to identify at an early
stage ethnopolitical conflicts within the new-old states as well as the causes of
wars between them so as to prevent such conflicts either with the means at its
                                                          
1
 CSCE = Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe; OSCE = Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe
2
 On the „old“ CSCE cf. vgl. Wilfried von Bredow, Der KSZE-Prozeß. Von der
Zähmung zur Auflösung des Ost-West-Konflikts. Darmstadt 1992; Alexis Heraclides,
Security and Co-operation in Europe. The Human Dimension, 1972-1992. London 1993; and
Arie Bloed (ed.), The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Basic Documents,
1972-1992. The Hague, London, Boston. MA, 1993; on the „new“ CSCE see Alexis
Heraclides, Helsinki-II and Its Aftermath: The Making of the CSCE into an International
Organization. London 1993; Heinz-Jürgen Axt, Auf dem Weg zur kollektiven Sicherheit? Die
KSZE nach Erweiterung und Institutionalisierung, in: Europäische Rundschau 21 (1993), No.
1, pp. 83-99; Peter Schlotter, Norbert Ropers, Berthold Meyer, Die neue KSZE.
Zukunftsperspektiven einer regionalen Friedensstrategie. Opladen 1994; and Arie Bloed (ed.),
The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Basic Documents, 1993-1995. The
Hague, London, Boston, MA, 1997; and on the present OSCE Victor-Yves Ghebali, L’OSCE
dans l’Europe post-communiste, 1990-1996. Vers une identité paneuropéenne de sécurité.
Bruxelles 1996; and Kurt P. Tudyka, Das OSZE-Handbuch. Die Organisation für Sicherheit
und Zusammenarbeit in Europa von Vancouver bis Wladiwostok. Opladen 1997.
5own disposal or together with other international partners. In areas where force
had already been used, the CSCE tried to return the dispute to the negotiating
table; and in post-war situations it offered its good offices as an intermediary for
permanent peaceful solutions.4
Following a period of several years spent searching for, trying out, and rejecting
a number of forms of action, mechanisms, channels and sub-committees, three
levels or institutions have emerged as crucial within the OSCE framework for
handling ethnopolitical conflicts in Eastern Europe. They are, firstly, the
Permanent Council made up of the Permanent Representatives of the currently
55 participating States of the OSCE; secondly, the High Commissioner on
National Minorities, who occupies a largely independent position within the
OSCE’s institutional framework owing to his broad mandate; and, thirdly, the
long-term missions which the OSCE maintains in over a dozen trouble spots and
which are linked through the Conflict Prevention Centre to the Vienna
headquarters, the OSCE Secretariat.5 The coordinating and managerial authority
for all these sub-divisions and sub-levels is the Chairman-in-Office, i.e. the
foreign minister of the participating State currently occupying the chair.6 Since
                                                                                                                                                                                     
4
 Konrad J. Huber, The CSCE and Ethnic Conflict in the East, in: Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report 2 (1993), No. 31, pp. 30-36; idem, The CSCE’s New
Role in the East: Conflict Prevention, in: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report 3
(1994), No. 31, pp. 23-30; Michael R. Lucas, Minority Rights and Conflict Management:
Developments in the CSCE and Their Inter-Institutional Context, in: Gerhard Seewann (ed.),
Minderheiten als Konfliktpotential in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa. Munich 1995, pp. 243-
281; Diana Chigas, Preventive Diplomacy and the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe: Creating Incentives for Dialogue and Cooperation, in: Abram Chayes and Antonia
Handler Chayes (eds.), Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World. Mobilizing
International and Regional Organizations. Washington, DC, 1996, pp. 25-97; and Stefan
Troebst, Das OSZE-Engagement bei ethnopolitischen Konflikten. Erfolge und Mißerfolge in
Osteuropa, in: Internationale Politik 52 (1997), No. 10, pp. 31-38.
5
 Piotr Switalski, Die Strukturen und Institutionen der OSZE, in: OSZE-Jahrbuch 1
(1995), pp. 385-397; Ettore Greco, The Role of the Conflict Prevention Centre in the Security
System of the CSCE, in: Helsinki Monitor 5 (1994), No. 1, pp. 5-15.
6
 Piotr Switalski, Der OSZE-Vorsitz: Entwicklung einer Institution, in: OSZE-
Jahrbuch 2 (1996), pp. 361-368.
6this chairmanship changes every year and therefore continuity is only partially
ensured, the Chairman-in-Office is assisted by his predecessor and his successor,
with whom he forms the so-called troika. In addition, he is supported by a
Secretary General, who is elected for a three-year term.7
The Permanent Council
The body in charge of the OSCE’s day-to-day activities, which are largely
centred on Eastern Europe, is the Permanent Council, formerly known as the
Permanent Committee or  the „Vienna Group“.8 The regular Thursday meetings
at the Vienna Hofburg conducted by the representative of the Chairman-in-
Office, informal meetings of this body also held weekly, problem-oriented
contact, regional and other sub-groups as well as confidential circles and
discussion groups on the fringes form the most important discussion,
consultation and decision-making forum of the OSCE. The heads of the long-
term missions, the High Commissioner and other OSCE officials regularly
report to the Permanent Council. The Council decides on sending new missions
and on extending and reformulating the mandates of existing missions.
Participating States submit pressing problems among each other to the Council
and discuss controversial issues. The Council also prepares and takes decisions
and, above all, decides on the budget. The Permanent Council is thus
increasingly replacing the once so influential Committee of Senior Officials
                                                          
7
 Pál Dunay, Zusammenarbeit in Konflikten: Der amtierende Vorsitzende und der
Generalsekretär – Ein künftiges Problem?, in: OSZE-Jahrbuch 1 (1995), pp. 399-410;
Michael Klor-Berchtold, Mehr Kompetenzen und Funktionen für den Generalsekretär?, in:
OSZE-Jahrbuch 3 (1997), pp. 383-392.
8
 Márton Krasznai, Beratung und politischer Dialog im Ständigen Rat, in: OSZE-
Jahrbuch 2 (1996), pp. 369-378.
7(since 1995: Senior Council), which now meets only once every four months.
Within the Permanent Council there are formalized groupings such as that of the
EU states as well as informal groups such as the Turkic-language participating
States. Further centres of power and interests are the CIS headed by the Russian
Federation and of course the transatlantic members USA and Canada. The
smaller and neutral states come accordingly under strong pressure to side with
one of these camps.
The High Commissioner on National Minorities
The office of High Commissioner on National Minorities, which is granted a
comprehensive mandate and considerable independence from the OSCE’s
Vienna headquarters, has been held since its establishment at the beginning of
1993 by the former foreign minister of the Netherlands, Max van der Stoel. His
activities, which he performs from The Hague, focus on containing rising inter-
ethnic tension and preventing ethnopolitical conflicts in Eastern Europe through
counselling, mediation and recommendations to the parties to the dispute.9
However, early warning to the Permanent Council together with early action as
stipulated in the mandate are not part of his activities.10 As a rule all this
                                                          
9
 [Rob Zaagman,] The Role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in
OSCE Conflict Prevention. An Introduction. The Hague 1997; [Alexandra Rothenberger,]
Bibliography on the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities: Documents,
Speeches and Related Publications, The Hague 1997; Jakob Haselhuber, Der Hochkommissar
für nationale Minderheiten der OSZE, in: Erich Reiter (ed.), Grenzen des Selbstbestimmungs-
rechts. Die Neuordnung Europas und das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker. Graz, Vienna,
Cologne 1997, pp. 109-177; and http://www.osceprag.cz/inst/hcnm. See also Max van der
Stoel, Die KSZE und die Minderheitenfrage, in: Europa-Archiv 49 (1994), No. 22, pp. 629-
635; and idem, The OSCE and Conflict Prevention: The Role of the High Commissioner on
National Minorities, Kompagnietor Lectures. European Centre for Minority Issues, Flensburg,
10 April 1997, http:/www.ecmi.de.
10
 Chigas, Preventive Diplomacy, p. 51 (as footnote 4). Cf. also María Amor Martín
8happens behind closed doors. Only some of the recommendations to
governments of participating States have been published to date.11 The High
Commissioner is currently dealing with matters relating to the Greek minority in
Albania, the Slovak minority in Hungary, Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and
Romania and inter-ethnic relations in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. There are
another five regional focuses, which are also covered by the OSCE long-term
missions, namely the situation of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia
and Latvia, the Albanian minority in Macedonia, the Serb minority in Croatia
and inter-ethnic relations on the Crimean peninsula which belongs to the
Ukraine. The treatment of Roma throughout Eastern Europe has now been
transferred to the newly formed “Contact Point for Sinti and Roma Issues“
within the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights based in
Warsaw which otherwise specialises in election monitoring in Eastern Europe.12
The current High Commissioner does not tire of sending two reminders to the
Vienna headquarters: „Capital invested in conflict prevention is capital well
spent“13 is one ceterum censeo, and “We must have an open eye for longer-term
developments with a view to anticipating future crises and not only pay attention
to already existing conflicts“, being the other.14 However readily Max van der
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Estébanez, The High Commissioner on National Minorities: Development of the Mandate, in:
Michael Bothe, Natalino Ronzitti, Allan Rosas (eds.), The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace
and Security: Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.
The Hague, London, Boston, MA, 1997, pp.123-165.
11
 Cf. the “OSCE Documents“ column in: Helsinki Monitor. Quarterly on Security and
Cooperation in Europe 6 (1995) - 8 (1997), as well as the chapter “Recommendations of the
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities“ with Bloed (ed.), The Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe. Basic Documents, 1993-1995, pp. 649-829 (as footnote
2).
12
 Audrey F. Glover, Das Büro für Demokratische Institutionen und Menschenrechte
1994-1997, in: OSZE-Jahrbuch 3 (1997), pp. 349-358
13
 Max van der Stoel, The Role of the CSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities in CSCE Preventive Diplomacy, in: Staffan Carlsson (ed.), The Challenge of
Preventive Diplomacy: The Experience of the CSCE, Stockholm 1994, pp. 33-54, here p. 33.
14
 Report by Mr Max van der Stoel, OSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities. OSCE Review Meeting, Vienna, 4-21 November 1996 (REF. RM/71/96/4
9Stoel is supported by the OSCE machinery and the participating States, the latter
in particular are reserved when it comes to providing financial backing.
Another focus of the High Commissioner’s efforts is setting international
standards for policy on minorities. In the course of his four years in this post,
aspects of language and education policy have gained in importance crucially in
Max van der Stoel’s eyes. In 1996 this prompted him, with the help of a group
of experts, to „attempt to clarify in relatively straight-forward language the
content of minority education rights generally applicable in the situations in
which the [High Commissioner] is involved“15 and to publish them in the form
of explicit proposals relating to the relevant legislation of the participating States
of the OSCE.
Owing to their unofficial nature, most of the High Commissioner’s activities are
not subject to external scrutiny. However, the considerable international prestige
acquired by Max van der Stoel through his OSCE work is unmistakable. This is
clearly demonstrated by the reluctance of even his resolute opponents among the
participating States  to stand up against him in public.
The long-term missions
The now established term of missions of long duration or long-term missions (as
opposed to shorter rapporteur missions and fact-finding missions) is misleading
insofar as the missions at least de jure are not sent for a long period; rather, their
duration has to be confirmed by the Permanent Council every six months. These
                                                                                                                                                                                     
November 1996), p. 12.
15
 The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National
Minorities and Explanatory Note. The Hague 1996, p. 3. Cf. also International Journal on
Minority and Group Rights 4 (1996/97), No. 2 (Special issue on the Education Rights of
National Minorities).
10
missions16, which usually consist of four to several dozen diplomats, army
officers, lawyers, economists, journalists and regional experts of varying age,
sex, religion, native language, ethnic background and nationality, are given
varying and often very flexible mandates depending on the problem at hand,
ranging from mere monitoring for early warning purposes and preventive
diplomacy to conflict management, mediation efforts and settlement of disputes.
In addition, according to the Swedish Chairman-in-Office of 1992, Margareta af
Ugglas, the missions are supposed to perform thee following functions:
“- to be an ‘ombudsman’ for aggrieved parties, to be at the receiving end when
the parties need to lodge their complaints about those wielding power, locally or
nationally
- to be the political antennae of the CSCE, picking up the first tremors of an
impending political upheaval or military confrontation
- to act as an intermediary in arranging contacts between the parties concerned
and external actors
- to become a trusted partner in a dialogue with the parties concerned and to act
as an adviser on various issues
- to be a mediator, to convince the parties of the virtues, the outline and the
details of a negotiated conflict settlement.“17
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 On the missions cf. in summary Herbert Grubmayr, Probleme und Schwierigkeiten
der Langzeitmissionen der OSZE, in: OSZE-Jahrbuch 4 (1998), pp. 237-254; Allan Rosas,
Timo Lahelma, OSCE Long-Term Missions, in: Bothe, Ronzitti, Rosas (eds.), The OSCE in
the Maintenance of Peace and Security, pp. 167-190 (as footnote 10); Stefan Troebst, “Dicke
Bretter, schwache Bohrer“. Die Langzeitmissionen der OSZE, in: Dieter Senghaas (ed.),
Frieden machen. Frankfurt/Main 1997, pp. 147-165; and I. Tersman, Small Steps in the Right
Direction: A report on the CSCE Long-term Missions, Working Paper, National Defence
Research Establishment. Stockholm 1994.
17
 Margareta af Ugglas, Conditions for Successful Preventive Diplomacy, in: Carlsson
(ed.), The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy, pp. 11-32, here p. 23 (as footnote 13).
11
The first two missions were sent in September 1992 to the Republic of
Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
Whereas the CSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to the Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia (presently called the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje)
remains in force to this day, seeking to achieve a settlement between the
majority population and the sizeable Albanian minority18, the CSCE Missions of
Long Duration to Kosovo, Sanjak and Vojvodina had to leave their operational
areas in July 1993 because the Belgrade authorities refused to extend the visas
of mission members.19 In February, High Commissioner Max van der Stoel has
been nominated Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office for Kosovo.
He managed to visit Kosovo only once, in February 1998, and that not in his
official but his private capacity.20 As a result of the Drenica massacre committed
by Serbian security forces against Albanian civilians in March 1998, the new
Polish Chairman appointed Felipe González as new Personal Representative for
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia including Kosovo. Owing to Belgrade’s
refusal to cooperate he, too, has not been able to fulfil his mandate.21
                                                          
18
 Cf. Giorgio Blais, Experiences with the CSCE Monitoring in the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, in: Jürgen Altmann et al. (eds.), Verification after the Cold War:
Broadening the Process. Amsterdam 1994, p. 302; Stefan Troebst, Präventive
Friedenssicherung durch internationale Beobachtermissionen? Das Beispiel der KSZE-
Spillover-Monitormission in Makedonien 1992-1993, in: Seewann (ed.), Minderheiten als
Konfliktpotential, pp. 282-331 (as footnote 4); Alice Ackermann, The Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia: A Relatively Successful Case of Conflict Prevention in Europe, in:
Security Dialogue 27 (1996), pp. 409-424; eadem, Die Republik Mazedonien und die OSZE,
in: OSZE-Jahrbuch 3 (1997), pp. 73-80.
19
 Franklin de Vrieze, Kosovo: Stable and Explosive, in: Helsinki Monitor 6 (1995),
No. 2, pp. 43-51; Veniamin Karakostanoglu, The Ethnic Conflict in Kosovo: A Test Case for
International Borders?, in: Heinz-Jürgen Axt (ed.), Beiträge zur Stabilisierung Südosteuropas
aus deutscher und griechischer Sicht. Munich 1995, pp. 152-163; Ghebali, L’OSCE dans
l’Europe (as footnote 2), pp. 391-402; Marcus Wenig, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der
Streitbeilegung ethnischer Konflikte durch die OSZE, dargestellt am Konflikt im ehemaligen
-XJRVODZLHQ %HUOLQ  SS  DQG 3UHGUDJ 6LPLü ’LH 26=( XQG GLH
Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien, in: OSZE-Jahrbuch 3 (1997), pp. 81-92.
20
 Arie Bloed, The OSCE response to conflicts in the region, in: Helsinki Monitor 8
(1997), No. 2, pp. 49-55, here pp. 50-51.
21
 Stefan Troebst, Conflict in Kosovo: Failure of Prevention? An Analytical
12
Since 1992 the number of long-term missions has multiplied. The OSCE is
currently maintaining missions in Georgia, Moldova and the Ukraine, which
focus on the crisis regions of South Ossetia, Transdniestria and the Crimea, as
well as in Estonia and Latvia where the emphasis is on the large Russian-
speaking portion of the residential population, in Tajikistan where the main
issues are conflict resolution and the building of a civil society, and since 1996
in Croatia with its Serb minority especially in Baranja and western Syrmia.22 A
special case is the mission to Groznyi tolerated with reluctance at first by the
Russian Federation, which allowing for Moscow’s sensitivities operates under
the official title of OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya. The same is true of the
OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus sent to Minsk at the end of
1997.23 The huge mission in Bosnia-Hercegovina comprising several hundred
members, which was sent in the wake of the Dayton Agreement and swallows
up almost half of the OSCE’s total budget, is very much out of the ordinary.24
And an even larger mission comprising several thousand military observers for
monitoring the Armenian-Azerbaijani ceasefire in Nagorny-Karabakh has been
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Documentation, 1989-1998. Flensburg 1998, pp. 26-32 (= ECMI Working Papers, 1); Jens
Reuter, Kosovo 1998, in: OSZE-Jahrbuch 4 (1998), pp. 203-214.
22
 Joachim Eicher, Die OSZE-Mission in Kroatien, in: OSZE-Jahrbuch 3 (1997), pp.
193-200; idem, Die OSZE-Mission in Kroatien — Erfahrungen, Probleme, Perspektiven, in:
Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen 38 (1998), No. 1, pp. 10-22; Elena Drozdik, Das schwierige
Geschäft mit der Wahrnehmung – OSZE-Beobachter in Kroatien, in: OSZE-Jahrbuch 4
(1998), pp. 215-222.
23
 Green Light for Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus, in: OSCE Newsletter,
vol. 4, no. 9, September 1997, p. 7; Heinz Timmermann, Die OSZE-Vertretung in Belarus, in:
OSZE-Jahrbuch 4 (1998), pp. 223-236.
24
 Robert F. Frowick, Die OSZE-Mission in Bosnien und Herzegowina, in: OSZE-
Jahrbuch 2 (1996), pp. 163-176; Peter Hazdra, Die OSZE-Mission in Bosnien-Herzegowina,
in: Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift 6 (1996), pp. 695-699; Marie-Janine Calic, Der
Beitrag der OSZE zur Demokratisierung Bosnien-Hercegovinas, in: OSZE-Jahrbuch 3 (1997),
pp. 143-156; special issue “The OSCE in Bosnia and Herzegovina“, Helsinki Monitor 8
(1997), No. 3; and Ed van Thijn, Stemmingen in Sarajevo. Dagboek van een Waarnemer.
Amsterdam 1997. See also Carsten Giersch, Konfliktregulierung in Jugoslawien 1991-1995.
Die Rolle von OSZE, EU, UNO und NATO. Baden-Baden 1998.
13
at the planning stage for five years now.25
To date, none of the missions sent since 1992 have been recalled, even though
the governments of such host countries as Estonia, the Ukraine and Macedonia
are urging this, because they feel stigmatised by the continued presence of an
OSCE mission with the considerable loss of sovereignty that this entails. Also
from the OSCE’s point of view, no mission mandate has been permanently
realized to date. Here the OSCE finds itself trapped by its own flexibility: all the
mandates are formulated so broadly that virtually any risk to the internal or
external security of the host country can constitute grounds for the mission’s
activities. This also means that it is difficult to fulfil and complete the mandate.
However, this very elasticity of the mandate ensures the considerable success of
the missions, even though spectacular breakthroughs are very rare indeed. For
instance, in Chechnya the OSCE’s efforts helped bring about a ceasefire under
very trying conditions26, and in Georgia the South Ossetia problem has been if
not eliminated then at least contained.27 The mission to Macedonia, a country
                                                          
25
 Terbi Hakala, The OSCE Minsk Process: A balance after five years, in: Helsinki
Monitor 9 (1998), No. 1, pp. 5-14; Rexane Dedashti, Nagorno-Karabakh: A Case-Study of
OSCE Conflict Settlement, in: Bothe, Ronzitti, Rosas (eds.), The OSCE in the Maintenance of
Peace and Security, pp. 459-477 (as footnote 10); Irina Busygina, The OSCE in Chechnya, in:
S. Neil MacFarlane, Oliver Thränert (eds.), Balancing Hegemony: The OSCE in the CIS.
Kingston, Ontario, 1997, pp. 115-129; Thomas Engelke, Der Karabach-Konflikt im
geopolitischen Kontext des Krisen- und Konfliktmanagements der OSZE. Frankfurt/M. 1997;
Michael Michalka, A Marriage of Convenience: The OSCE and Russia in Nagorny-Karabakh
and Chechnya, in: Helsinki Monitor 7 (1996), No. 2, pp. 13-28; and Helmut W. Ganser, Die
Bemühungen der OSZE um eine Beilegung des Konfliktes um Berg-Karabach, in: OSZE-
Jahrbuch 1 (1995), pp. 187-191.
26
 Elfie Siegel, Wir haben nichts mehr zu verlieren. Alltag im zerbombten Grosny, in:
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 198 of 26 August 1995, “Bilder und Zeiten“ supplement;
István Gyarmati, Die ungarische Vorsitz und der Tschetschenien-Konflikt, in: OSZE-
Jahrbuch 2 (1996), pp. 177-188; Ursel Schlichting, Das Engagement der OSZE in Tsch-
etschenien, in: OSZE-Jahrbuch 1 (1995), pp. 211-220; Tim Guldimann. Die Tauben gegen die
Falken unterstützen. Erfahrungen der OSZE-Unterstützungsgruppe in Tschetschenien, in:
OSZE-Jahrbuch 3 (1997), pp. 133-142.
27
 George Khutsishvili, The OSCE and Conflict in Georgia, in: S. Neil MacFarlane,
Oliver Thränert (eds.), Balancing Hegemony: The OSCE in the CIS. Kingston, Ontario, 1997,
pp. 101-110; Friedrich W. Kriesel, Die KSZE-Mission in Georgien/Südossetien und ihre
14
which was subjectively under the threat of a Serb invasion in 1992 and
objectively suffering from the UN embargo imposed on rump-Yugoslavia as
well as from an economic blockade from Greece, was important in the absence
of international recognition of the new mini republic at least until the arrival of
an United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR, presently United Nations
Preventive Deployment—UNPREDEP) as a “consolation“ in terms of
promoting psychological stability and providing reliable information, while also
serving as an early warning system and a stumbling-block for any potential
aggressor.28 The Moldova mission managed together with Russian, and more
recently Ukrainian, mediation to bring the central government in &KLœLQXDQG
the self-appointed “Transdniestrian Moldavian Republic“ on the eastern bank of
the Dniester closer to a negotiated settlement.29 The Tajikistan mission
established an ombudsman office under the most adverse conditions30, while the
Ukraine mission made a crucial contribution to defusing the standoff between
the central government in Kiev and the Russian-speaking majority in Crimea,
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Zusammenarbeit mit den russischen Friedenstruppen, in: Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Anna
Kreikemeyer, Andrej W. Zagorski (eds.), Krisenmanagement in der GUS: Wohin steuert Ru-
ßland? Baden-Baden 1995, pp. 179-190; Hansjörg Eiff, Die OSZE-Mission für Georgien, in:
OSZE-Jahrbuch 1 (1995), pp. 179-186.
28
 Troebst, Präventive Friedenssicherung (as footnote 18).
29
 Adam Daniel Rotfeld, In Search of a Political Settlement — The Case of the
Conflict in Moldova, in: Carlsson (ed.), The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy, pp. 100-137
(as footnote 13); Donald Johnson (Donal’d Dzhonson), Mezhdunarodnoe posrednichestvo v
NRQIOLNWH Y 5HVSXEOLNH 0ROGRYH LQ 9DOHULX 0RœQHDJD HG 6WDWXO QDWLRQDO œL VRFLHWDWHD
SROLHWQLF 0ROGRYD vQ DQLL  0DWHULDOH , VLPSR]LRQ PROGRJHUPDQ &KLœLQX 13-18
octombrie 1996). &KLœLQX 1996, pp. 83-88; Rolf Welberts, Der Einsatz der OSZE in der
Republik Moldau, in: OSZE-Jahrbuch 1 (1995), pp. 193-210; Klemens Büscher,
Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der OSZE-Konfliktmanagements in Moldova, in: Ethnos —
Nation 3 (1995), No. 2, pp. 71-84; Günte Joetze, The OSCE Mission to Moldova, in: S. Neil
MacFarlane, Oliver Thränert (eds.), Balancing Hegemony: The OSCE in the CIS. Kingston,
Ontario, 1997, pp. 133-141; Stefan Troebst, Der Transnistrienkonflikt und seine Bearbeitung
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which escalated dramatically in March 1995.31 In Estonia and Latvia the
missions helped stabilize the situation through partial reduction of the tension in
relations between the titular nation and the Russian-speaking residential
population.32
A key to the relative success of the missions is their flat command structure and
practice-oriented composition. Even the senior posts, that of head of mission, his
deputy and, where necessary, team leaders, are not held exclusively by career
diplomats but also by people from other walks of life. For instance, a French
specialist in Oriental studies headed the mission to Tajikistan and a Swiss
journalist the Ukraine mission. The language skills and regional knowledge of
their members and the usually highly qualified local staff mean that OSCE
missions are very well grounded as a rule.
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An interim appraisal
„What is unique about the OSCE?“ Katherine Birmingham recently asked,
pointing in particular to the combination of short-term crisis management and
long-term conflict prevention. At the same time, she stressed that the OSCE’s
tasks relating to ethnopolitical conflicts in Eastern Europe were more clearly
defined than that of the United Nations and more practice-oriented than that of
the Council of Europe.33 Another essential element is that the OSCE is the only
operational pan-European organization in which the Russian Federation is a full
member. Thus, in Eastern Europe this governmental network stretching from
Aqmola to Ottawa suffers less and less from the odium of a “Western Agency“.
The rising number of Eastern Europeans at the Vienna headquarters, in the long-
term missions and at the Hague-based office of the High Commissioner on
National Minorities is also helping this trend, as testified by the gradual but
steady improvement in cooperation between the OSCE and the Russian
Federation in the CIS region.34 Thanks to the constant presence and thus high
visibility among the public, the authorities and the governments in the Eastern
European crisis regions, it is the missions that stand for the OSCE locally and
not the headquarters on the imposing Kärtner Ring in Vienna. Not least for this
reason the missions perform functions beyond their direct and specific tasks in
effectively conveying the values of Helsinki into the zone of tension between the
EU’s eastern borders and China’s western border.
The now harmonious coordination of the complementary activities being
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pursued by the long-term missions and the High Commissioner with their
clearly defined tasks as well as the routinely smooth coordination between the
Chairman-in-Office, the Permanent Council and the Secretariat with regard to
OSCE policy at local level, meaning in Eastern Europe’s areas of tension, are
greatly enhancing responsiveness and efficiency. However, there is some
interorganizational friction such as that reported by the former head of the
Ukraine mission, the Swiss journalist Andreas Kohlschütter, relating to the
OSCE’s management of the Crimea crisis in March 1995:
„Against the background of the Crimea experience, this [criticism] concerns in
particular the weak points in the OSCE’s decision-making mechanisms and
communication structures. At the moment of the critical escalation of the
Crimea problem they played a disappointingly weak role [...]. There was no
clear, coherent and coordinated leadership. The OSCE signals that were sent
out when the situation escalated in March 1995 were contradictory for a long
period. Poorly defined areas of responsibility were as paralyzing and unsettling
as the frequent and long absences of indispensable OSCE decision-makers. At
this critical time for crisis prevention [...] no common clear and therefore
effective language in terms of preventive diplomacy was found [emphasis in the
original].“35
Regardless of this unfavourable example and the favourable cases cited, the
question of the success or failure of the OSCE in handling ethnopolitical
conflicts in Eastern Europe cannot be answered conclusively. “Today“, noted a
leading German CSCE diplomat in 1993, “it can only be said that no new
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conflicts have broken out in the regions where the CSCE has been active“36, and
even five years on it is not possible to improve on this qualified statement.
However, it can be said that the OSCE is expected to show some success in
dealing with ethnopolitical conflicts where away from its rivalry with the United
Nations, NATO or the European Union it can set its sights somewhat lower —
Chechnya, Crimea, the Baltic states, South Ossetia, Transdniestria, Macedonia
and Eastern Slavonia. The major conflicts such as Bosnia-Hercegovina or
Nagorny-Karabakh are too unmanageable for its still embryonic structures with
its insufficient military know-how and low acceptance among major partners. It
cannot be expected to accomplish more than to transform conflicts that have
broken out and to prevent future conflict in the still strong force field unleashed
by the epoch-making 1989. The tectonic changes in Eastern Europe’s newly
emerging landscape of states and nations have not yet come to a standstill in
many regions.
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